Okay, done editing now.
That says nothing of your ability to make a decision to go to the store; rather, it says something of your ability to actualize it. The ability to actualize such a thing would thus be your power(I am using these concepts in a conventional Metaphysical sense), so that says something of your power and not so much your decisions.
But see, that's the problem. You've started with two basic assumptions, 1) that this has to do with metaphysical power, and 2) that it has to do with actualization.
Yet the mundane world talks about free will as well, and the mundane people do not have metaphysical power to actualize their intentions via magic, and so they must utilize mundane methods in order to actualize their intentions. So, because a mundane person cannot "guarantee" the outcome via magic, it's hard or impossible for them to assume that the results of their efforts need automatically be included in the definition of free will. ("Actualization" is just a fancy word for "Well, I tried and I just so happened to have succeeded." Failure to actualize means "I tried, but failed." Refusing to attempt to actualize in the first place means "I didn't even try.")
Also, your argument is illogical, because it presupposes that if something is finite, it is determined; however, that is an unproven assumption within that reasoning.
I do not presuppose that.
You say that we were not always here so we are born(that implies a degree of being finite) and we die(this also implies finite)
Yes and yes. Both easily noted by looking at the real world.
where this is how things were set up(this implies something teleological and determined)
Not at all. This is merely an observation of the real world, much like observing gravity. Observing that something happens does not mean that it was set up for the very purpose of happening that way. We are born, and we die. This is the way that the universe is set up, not necessarily because that's the purpose, but because that's the reality. Teleological has to do with reasons for things, not mechanics of things. I'm talking about the mechanics of things.
where our will in this is not relevant in whether we are born or die.
I think the first is fairly easy to prove; I did not have a choice in whether I was born. The second will be a matter for when I die, and will be determined based on how I die, whether by my own choice or not. Ie, if I put a gun to my own head then I've used my own will, but if I die of old age then it is not my will that made me die, and instead the mechanics of (not "the reason for") the universe.
You have not proven the third point
Third point.. third point...
The one about "so that says something of your power and not so much your decisions"?
Since the first point you made was "rather, it says something of your ability to actualize it"
and the second was " The ability to actualize such a thing would thus be your power(I am using these concepts in a conventional Metaphysical sense)"
Unless you grouped all that together in a single point, in which case point three would be the statement right before the statement about the third point:
"You say that we were not always here so we are born(that implies a degree of being finite) and we die(this also implies finite) where this is how things were set up(this implies something teleological and determined) where our will in this is not relevant in whether we are born or die."
In which case, no I didn't "prove" it, just like I didn't prove much of what I said, as I was providing arguments rather than proofs. But, as I said in this
point, the proof is pretty much universally available to anyone who wants to look and see that we are born not by our own choice, and whether we die by our own choice or not is partially a matter of choice (if you're mulling it over, but get hit by a bus, then you didn't really enact your own will). But I never said anything about the mechanics of how things are set up being the reason for why things are set up the way they are; that's your
argument, not mine.
We cannot say versus having free will, we only have free time.
Well, actually I can say that, and I did. And I will expound upon that a bit more, since you seem to have confused "Free Will" with "Will".
If I am "free" from jail, it means I have no shackles holding me down, I am not in a jail cell, I don't have guards and other inmates telling me what to do, and restricting me from doing what I want to do. It means I am "free" to make my own decisions about how I want to go about my daily life and do whatever I want to do. Yet, we're not "free" from the universe because we have inherent shackles that are a part of our physiological condition, such as our need to eat. If we attempt to enact our "free" will by refusing to eat, I'm pretty sure we could agree that at least
99.999999% of the humans on the planet would die. Thus, it's not much of a "free" will if it automatically leads to our destruction. Thus, we are not free. Thus, we do not have "free will", but we do have "will", in the sense that I can still refuse to eat.
Unless, of course, you want to disengage the making
of one's choices and actions from the results
of one's choices and actions. In which case "free will" is just the ability to try, rather than the ability to succeed. (Ie, disassemble "actualization")
This is not even how it physically works, for your brain is not a determined thing. The chemical processes in the genetic and cellular interactions are stochastic and thus nondeterministic.
On the other hand, if that were true, then how are 99% of humans created according to the genetic programming? If it were purely unpredicable due to certain random variables, then humans wouldn't have a fairly easily recognizable form.
It seems like you have contradicted yourself in that you are arguing that being finite takes away from free will(which it does not)
Seems like, but not quite. As I explained with the jail explanation, being finite in itself is not what takes away free will; being shackled does. We could, in the big picture, equate shackles to finite, and if we did that then we would indeed find that being finite detracts from a "big picture" concept of Free Will, in that I cannot Will myself to live forever in whatever form I desire. Thus, limitations, thus shackles, thus not so much free to do entirely
as we please, even if we still have a pretty large sandbox within which we can do lots of different things.
all the while stating we still can randomly do things(again, you conflated decisions with carrying out those decisions, for willfully thinking about getting a glass of water is a willful act though you might not actually ever get the water)
Herein, I would disagree with two things: 1) As I stated before, whether one includes the results in the definition is a matter of definition (and you yourself
"conflated decisions with carrying out those decisions" when you brought in the word "actualization"), and 2) While one could say that having a thought is itself an act, I would disagree here because the way I am using the concept of "action" in this topic is for the express purpose of attempting "to fulfill a choice", or "to actualize one's Will". So somewhere else I might agree that having a thought is an act in itself, but for this topic I'm defining willful actions to be actual actions, not merely thoughts of such (because thinking
about getting a glass of water isn't going to quench your thirst, and is therefore, in reference to "actualization", entirely useless on its own).
I have found arguing ethics in a strictly philosophical sense to be a dead end, and, instead, I prefer to argue it from an empirical stance. For example, in a failed state(in the sense of a dystopian government), there is a high amount of violence.
So you're arguing backwards, from results to reasons, rather than forwards. I counter with Machiavelli: "In judging policies we should consider the results that have been achieved through them rather than the means by which they have been executed." Machiavelli holds one of the major camps in this issue, but there are others.
In societies where that is not the case, senseless violence and murder are not as prevalent. From this, we can make empirical observations and derive a code of ethics(we should not go around murdering people for no reason, because it makes for an unstable society where humans as a whole are not likely to survive in such a state).
The problem being that most codes of ethics aren't done that way. Most codes of ethics are formulated by many many interactions between individuals, where each individual in the interaction has a desired outcome, and they utilize various forms of communications and forces to figure out which is the resultant path "here and now", and over the course of many of these events "a" (actually several) "ill-defined but still fairly concrete" code of ethics emerges that defines a society (where the society is the group of people who are interacting). Very much a grass roots series of events rather than a top down enforced decision. Even now, as we talk, we are defining ethical interactions within this society, as are the people who remain silent.
That makes no sense. The problem is that you have conflated the internal volition and decision to do something with the ability to actually go about doing it in the real world.
How does that not make sense? You yourself defined exactly that as "actualization". I'm not saying that's the "right answer" to the question of ethics, but have pointed it out as one of the major camps in the discussion. It does
make sense, however, and you've already agreed elsewhere that it makes sense. As above, without the action to accompany the thought, of what value is the thought in itself? What good is it to think "I'm thirsty. I need water" if you never get off your ass and get some water?
This means that if a person lacks power to protect their life, that does not imply they did not have free will to decide that they wanted to live.
According to some it does, especially if they attempted
to enact their Will to live, yet failed. They obviously didn't have the "Freedom" to live, thus lack of "free" will. They still enacted their will, but whether that will is free or not could indeed be defined entirely on whether it succeeded. Though I'm not saying it is
that way; I'm merely noting that is one major possibility that cannot be so easily discounted, due to the various possible definitions of various words used in the debate.
Yes, it yet again comes down to linguistics in this case, because there is no physical object of "Free Will" or "Freedom" or "Will" that can be taken into a laboratory, cut into pieces, studied with all sorts of fancy cutting edge technologies, and have a definitive answer be brought back. Thus, we do the only thing we can do, which is argue over it because it is just words (and the thoughts that go with them, before anyone becomes a smart ass).
The issue I have with fatalistic and deterministic sounding ideologies is that it implies a mitigation of personal responsibility which is ethically problematic.
I don't believe there's anything in the topic of "define free will as including the results" that has anything to do with personal responsibility in regards to ethics. Will and Ethics are not the same topic.
The brains that produce our physical consciousness are stochastic yet dynamical systems that are not deterministic
And yet... scientists can poke around in the brain and cause people to have all sorts of weird experiences and sensations... And there is the theory regarding "keep tracing every action to smaller and smaller effects, and eventually you'll see that it is all deterministic, even if the resultant determinations would be mind-bogglingly loaded with factors" (though, I disagree with this theory myself, it is still popular among some).
and finite boundaries do not imply determined configurations within those boundaries
I absolutely agree with this. Unless you're using it to mean something else.
rather, it implies that the boundaries are exhaustive of whatever is inside them.
Potentially so. If I have a 6 sided die and roll it 1 million times, theoretically each side should come up at least once. But then, statistically, there should
be runs, eventually, of dice rolls which did not include one or more sides. But a six sided die has the potential to roll any of the six sides within its limits, but is not required to roll any specific one of them (determinism bad, except in the case of double-slit experiments >_>), and cannot roll a 7, is what I think you're mostly getting at.
Without an additional postulation, we can say that something can randomly be any given thing in those boundaries.
If you're talking Schrodinger's cat style experiment, where we've purposefully put everything in a box and we don't know what's happening because we remain willfully ignorant, then sure, I can agree to that.
If what is in the finite box are all the possible choices you could make, it says nothing of what choice you are determined to make.
I agree. Unless the box includes requirements for choices you will
make (we are, for instance, genetically programmed to mate. even if a single individual may choose to forgo this, over the course of the species we will
mate). But that talks about actions, rather than ethics.